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PATRÍCIA VIEIRA
Trading Our Way out of War:  
Perpetual Peace without Politics
Proponents of perpetual peace have often identified politics as a problem standing in 
the way of peaceful relations between humans. They believed that, while politics exac-
erbates the differences separating nations, commerce brings human beings together. 
In this article, I trace the development of arguments against politics and for commerce 
from the late fifteenth to the early nineteenth century. I argue that thinkers espoused 
an idealized view of commerce as an activity that fostered the development of a peace-
ful international community, while gradually eliminating economic inequalities. I also 
highlight how these arguments still resonate with today’s debates on globalization.
Keywords: conflicts resolution; economic relations; free trade; globalization; peacebuild-
ing; perpetual peace; political relations.
A World Mercantile Republic
The best political path towards establishing perpetual peace amongst human 
beings has long been a heated subject of debate. Some have endorsed the 
creation of a federation of states that would mediate conflicts between its 
members. Initially, this alliance was imagined as including only European, 
Christian nations, as in the proposals of Quakers William Penn and John 
Bellers, or in the more famous projects of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre or Jean- 
-Jacques Rousseau, but it could be expanded to encompass all countries 
of the world. Yet, how to persuade states to enter such a federation? And 
should it be a loose coalition of nations or a tightly knit political union, 
following the model later adopted by the United States of America? In his 
renowned essay on perpetual peace, Immanuel Kant is ambiguous about 
the political form of the peaceful time to come. He puts forth the idea of 
an international state that would embrace all human beings, but quickly 
recognizes that this cosmopolitan world republic (Weltrepublik) would not 
be feasible (Kant, 2008a: 105). Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pacifists 
saw in the development of international law the safest political road to a 
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lasting world peace. But who was to enforce international right? One state, 
a group of states, or an organization representing all nations? And whence 
would such an international body derive its political clout?
Given the seemingly unsurmountable difficulties surrounding the political 
route to perpetual peace, a possible answer to the question of abolishing war 
began to emerge from a different quarter. What if perpetual peace could 
not be achieved through political means? Could politics be the problem 
and not part of the solution? What if the end of history will take the shape 
neither of a federation of nations nor of an international state but, rather, 
of a “great mercantile republic”, to borrow Adam Smith’s formulation 
(Smith, 2012 [1776]: 433), where each human being strives towards her 
own interest and, concomitantly, the interest of all?
Make Business, Not War
Advocates for peace often identify the disruption of trade as one of the nega-
tive consequences of war. Armed conflict lays waste the land, thus diminishing 
the amount of agricultural products that can be traded. At the same time, 
it impedes commercial exchange not only between warring nations but, more 
broadly, in the whole region where fighting takes places, due to insecurity and 
to the destruction of roads, harbors, and so on. In his passionate plea against 
war, The New Cyneas (1909 [1623]), Émeric Crucé contrasts the destruction 
brought about by soldiers to the wealth that merchants generate:
[...] there is no occupation to compare in utility with that of the merchant who legi-
timately increases his resources by the expenditure of his labor […]: in which he is 
more worthy of praise than the soldier whose advancement depends upon the spoil 
and the destruction of others. (Crucé, 1909 [1623]: 58)
Crucé advises princes to encourage their subjects, and especially soldiers, 
to turn to commerce, instead of idly waiting for the next war. For, if conflict 
prevents trade, the best result of a “universal peace [is] the establishment 
of commerce” that will bring prosperity to the nation (ibidem: 60). 
The idea that trade should replace war in international relations was 
adroitly articulated by Jean-Baptiste Colbert in a memorandum to French 
King Louis XIV. “Commerce”, he wrote, “is a perpetual and peaceable war 
of wit and energy among all nations” (apud Hont, 2010: 23). Even though 
he suggests that commerce is war through other means, Colbert’s empha-
sis lies in the oxymoronically “peaceful” nature of trade wars that employ 
“wit and energy”, instead of destructive weapons. While Colbert’s policies 
may not always have lived up to his peaceful design, his preference for 
Perpetual Peace without Politics | 7
commerce echoed a feeling shared by a vast majority of thinkers at the time. 
Trade was regarded as a peaceful way to relate to other nations that soft- 
ened the barbarian disposition nurtured by war. In fact, the image of com-
merce as a “gentle” (“doux”) and innocuous activity was very widespread 
in Western Europe (Hirschman, 2013: 56-63). More than a century after 
Colbert, Jeremy Bentham was dismayed to note that politicians tended to 
encourage war, not trade: “All trade is in its essence advantageous – even 
to the party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous; and yet 
the great employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war 
and to put fetters on trade” (Bentham, 2008: 152).
Armed conflicts are not only ruinous to a country’s economy, they also 
deprive human beings of what is, for some thinkers, a fundamental right: 
the ability to trade. Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, for example, 
saw the right to trade as an essential part of ius gentium: the law of nations 
or, in a more modern rendition, “international law”. In his discussion of 
whether the native population of the Americas could be legitimately subju-
gated by the Spanish conquistadores, Vitoria was understandably skeptical 
about the legal justification for the occupation of indigenous land. Even so, 
he believed that “[…] the Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbar-
ians, so long as they do no harm to their homeland”, since “travelers may 
carry on trade so long as they do no harm to the citizens” (Vitoria, 2010 
[1538-1539]: 279). Vitoria seems here to be adapting an old argument to 
a colonial setting: in other words, he is urging the Spaniards to engage in 
commerce, not war, with the native American population.
It is worth dwelling on Vitoria’s explanation of the right to trade. 
Following Christian theology, he argues that, in the beginning of the world, 
all things were held in common and “everyone was allowed to visit and 
travel through any land he wished”. This right was not revoked with the 
division of property, which should allow for human beings’ “free mutual 
intercourse with one another” (ibidem: 278). In his move from common 
ownership to property, though, Vitoria seamlessly performs a conceptual 
leap that will be central for his defense of trade: at first he mentions only 
the right to travel, as trade was unnecessary in a situation when everything 
belonged to everyone; once property was established, the right to trade was 
added to the right to visit foreign regions. Vitoria sees trading rights as a pale 
shadow of the time when the whole world was held in common. Free com-
mercial exchanges between human beings might restore a balance that was 
lost with the transformation of the world’s resources into private property. 
Through trade, each party gets what it needs and sells its excess merchan-
dize: “they [the indigenous population] may import the commodities which 
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they lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which they have in 
abundance” (ibidem). As we shall see below, the idea that trade tends toward 
an economic equilibrium between the various participants in a commercial 
exchange and, therefore, promotes the peaceful coexistence of the parties 
involved, will enjoy a long life in economic thought.
Vitoria was not alone in linking the right to trade to the primordial common 
ownership of the world by humans. In fact, this argument became a staple 
in the writings of natural law theorists and political philosophers alike, from 
Hugo Grotius, through John Locke, to Immanuel Kant. The cosmopolitan-
ism envisioned by Kant originated in the “right to the earth’s surface which 
the human race shares in common” (Kant, 2008a: 106). This “community of 
the land” that encompasses all nations is a “community of reciprocal action 
(commercium)”, and “[e]ach [member] may offer to have commerce with the 
rest, and they all have a right to make such overtures” (Kant, 2008b: 172). 
Granted, the German word Kant used for “commerce” (Verkehr) does not 
exclusively mean the buying and selling of goods and services, but he certainly 
saw trade as a part of a larger “commerce” between all human beings. This 
exchange “affords the prospect that all nations may unite for the purpose 
of creating certain universal laws to regulate the intercourse they may have 
with one another” (ibidem). Kant goes even further than his predecessors, 
in that he squarely identifies the right to commerce with cosmopolitan right: 
“this right [to have commerce with others] may be termed cosmopolitan 
(ius cosmopolitikum)” (ibidem). The cosmopolitan world of perpetual peace 
envisioned by the German philosopher would be a society of traders. 
The “spirit of commerce”, writes Kant, “sooner or later takes hold of 
every people” and, because “it cannot exist side by side with war”, it will 
lead nations towards peace (Kant, 2008a: 114). This formulation is indicative 
of a subtle inversion in the relationship between peace and trade that took 
place in post-Renaissance Europe. While, at first, most thinkers focused on 
the negative effects of war for commerce and, conversely, on the economic 
advantages of peace, the emphasis progressively shifted to trade. From being 
a welcome outcome of peaceful relations between states, trade became the 
engine that would promote cordial interactions between humans. To be 
sure, Kant’s version of perpetual peace still entailed a strong political and 
legal component. However, as the idea of free trade gained momentum 
in economic thought, politics was increasingly regarded with suspicion. 
If commerce brought people together, political rivalries divided nations and 
often led to war. But how to do away with politics altogether? And what 
about the commercial wars that were becoming increasingly common in a 
Europe dominated by colonial powers?
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Politics against Economics
In a short 1758 essay titled “Of the Jealousy of Trade”, David Hume 
bemoans the shortsightedness of states that look upon their neighbors as 
trading foes (Hume, 1987b [1758]). They mistakenly assume that, if the 
economy of other nations flounders, they necessarily stand to gain. Hume’s 
not so hidden agenda here is to take a jab at mercantilist economic policies 
that favored the accumulation of monetary reserves and a positive balance 
of trade and, therefore, fostered not only economic competition but also 
outright political enmity between states. His portrayal of divergent positions 
vis-à-vis the benefits of free trade resonates with discussions on commerce 
that have lasted until today.
In his in-depth study of jealousy of trade, Istvan Hont outlines the debate 
over this issue in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For Hont, the 
issue came to the foreground of political thought at a time when a nation’s 
success in international commerce could determine its economic and even 
political survival. This politicization of commerce was perspicuously noted 
by Hume, who pointed out in his 1742 essay “Of Civil Liberty” that “[t]rade 
was never deemed an affair of state till the last century; and there scarcely is 
any ancient writer on politics, who has made mention of it” (Hume, 1987a 
[1742]). Even though Hume may have overstated his point about ancient 
writers’ almost complete avoidance of commercial matters, he clearly identi-
fied a qualitative change in the political role played by commerce. Thinkers 
of the time adduced different reasons to explain the escalating jealousy of 
trade witnessed by Hume. Inheritors of Italian-style political republicanism 
saw it as a degradation of republican morality and a source of false reason 
of state, while natural law theorists and political economists considered it 
to be an anachronistic remnant of Renaissance bellicosity contaminating 
modern commercial societies (Hont, 2010: 10-11). In spite of widespread 
condemnation, jealousy of trade did not decrease, and the Seven Years’ 
War was a painful reminder of its devastating effects. Could this problem 
be avoided? Would commerce fulfill its promise of bringing peace and 
prosperity to Europe?
The conflation of politics and economics and the ensuing application 
of reason-of-state thinking to international trade were clearly explosive. 
Several authors tried their hand at finding a solution to this conundrum in 
order to break the link between war and commercial development. One 
possible way out of the problem would be a return to a pre-modern mode 
of economic and socio-political organization. This was the answer put forth 
by, among others, Archbishop Fénelon, author of the immensely popular 
political novel Telemachus, Son of Ulysses (1699). In this Bildungsroman, 
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Fénelon sketched the prototype of a good monarch, who should repudiate 
luxuriousness and lead a simple, unassuming life, a portrait widely inter-
preted as a criticism of the lavish court of Louis XIV. In his idealized state 
of Salente, agriculture was the priority, and the excess population of the 
cities was removed to work in the countryside. Even though the fine arts 
were cultivated, “superfluous arts, which divert the poor from the culture 
of the lands for the supply of real needs, and corrupt the rich by intro- 
ducing among them luxury and softness” had been suppressed (Fénelon, 
1994 [1699]: 296). In Salente, international trade would be kept to a mini-
mum, since the country was able to produce all agricultural goods it needed 
and luxurious excesses were frowned upon. 
Intimately related to Fénelon’s imaginary Salente is the idea of completely 
closing off states to trade. If commerce spawned conflict, the way out of 
war would be to withdraw from international trade altogether, following 
the example of China. Fichte drew up one of the most detailed descriptions 
of this economic model in The Closed Commercial State (2012 [1800]). 
In his view, the belligerent competitiveness of European nations would only 
be overcome when each state developed an autonomous planned economy 
capable of securing the well-being of its citizens without the assistance of 
other countries. Unlike Fénelon, Fichte did not think that nations should 
focus primarily on agriculture, and industrial production played a central 
role in his closed commercial state. Still, he believed that the eradication 
of jealousy of trade required national self-sufficiency and the abolition of 
all commercial exchanges between states. Only full economic indepen- 
dence would eliminate existing reasons to wage war and inaugurate a time 
of perpetual peace.
For all his defense of trade, Adam Smith echoed in many sections of 
The Wealth of Nations (1776) the aversion of other economic theorists to 
the imbalances inherent in commercial societies, and especially in large com-
mercial cities. He praised the cultivation of the land as a more solid source 
of wealth than trade since it is less dependent upon war and changes in 
government (Smith, 2012 [1776]: 413). He also believed “the lower ranks 
of people in the country [to be] really superior to those of the town”, 
a fact “well known to every man whom either business or curiosity has led 
to converse much with both” (ibidem: 133). According to Smith, the natural 
progress of the economy should lead first to the development of the country-
side and only later of cities. In many European states, however, this natural 
order of things was inverted, with manufacture and foreign trade influencing 
the main improvements in agriculture (ibidem: 376-377). Smith attributes 
part of the blame for this “unnatural and retrograde order” (ibidem: 377), 
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whereby the industry of towns is superior to that of the countryside, to cor-
poration laws and other regulations that enable the inhabitants of cities to 
raise the prices of their products unduly. His answer to the excesses of city 
life is to do away with protectionist measures that favor urban economies, 
so as to better reward farmers for their work (ibidem: 133).
The return to a predominantly agrarian, scarcely industrialized society 
and economic self-sufficiency, coupled with the closing off of a state to for-
eign trade, would require considerable political interference in the economy. 
In opposition to these two options, Smith considered that political intrusion 
in commercial matters in order to control economic development, through 
the creation of monopolies, the implementation of tax treaties, excessive 
taxation of certain goods, drawbacks, bounties, and so on, not only was 
nefarious to progress but also fueled imbalances – for example, between 
the city and the countryside, the metropolis and its colonies – that could 
lead to conflicts, as was the case with the American Revolutionary War. 
He was convinced that unimpaired trade functioned according to natural 
laws and would be beneficial to the vast majority of a nation’s population. 
Even though some merchants might stand to lose with the end of govern-
mental influence on commerce, a country as a whole would always profit 
from free markets. Smith called for the restoration of all branches of the 
economy to “that natural, healthful, and proper proportion which perfect 
liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve” 
(Smith, 2012 [1776]: 602).
The naturalization of free trade and the conception of market forces as 
benign economic agents, distorted only by “unnatural” political interference, 
undergird not only Smith’s economic thought but also his understanding of 
social dynamics. When he writes that every individual is “led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention” (ibidem: 445), 
he is implicitly adhering to a theory of historical advancement whereby 
human beings unwittingly participate in a larger plan for humankind. Smith 
does not deny that there is “an end” to each person’s actions but underlines 
the fact that, when promoting their own interests, individuals are usually 
unaware of the broader consequences of their deeds.
Smith’s “invisible hand” has a function similar to that of nature in the 
Kantian philosophy of history, dating from less than two decades later. Both 
the “invisible hand” and nature were surrogates of divine providence that 
had a design for the development of humanity. While Kant clearly spells 
out the purpose of humankind – creating a perfect political constitution 
that would guarantee perpetual peace –, Smith never discloses what he 
thought would be the ultimate aim of the “invisible hand”. Still, he hints at 
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the fact that a peaceful society would be a commercial republic, where the 
economy follows its “natural” course and each individual is free to pursue 
her interests, contributing, at the same time, to the greater good.
Some of the inconsistencies in Kant’s political thought result from his 
reliance on a plan of nature or of providence to reach humanity’s full poten-
tial, while also counting on politics to achieve this goal. He was unwilling 
to abandon the idea of individual agency, as this would flatly contradict 
his moral philosophy, and could never fully reconcile political action with 
nature’s work independent of human agency. Unlike Kant, Smith believed 
that political activity should be kept to a minimum since the – natural or 
providential – invisible hand would guide human beings in a peaceful 
direction. For him, jealousy of trade resulted from the selfishness of some 
merchants, who persuaded governments to trample upon public interest and 
bend the laws of the market so that it would work in their favor, as well as 
from political rivalries between different nations, and could only be avoided 
by severely curtailing governmental intrusion into economic matters. 
The debate on jealousy of trade laid bare a contradiction that is inher-
ent in most modern nations, a predicament in which we still find ourselves 
today: states are, for the most part, closed political entities but open com-
mercial societies (Hont, 2010: 55). In order to overcome this discrepancy 
between the political and the economic realms, it would be necessary either 
to close off the economy or to do away with political divisions. Although few 
unreservedly embraced either of these two radical solutions, the economic 
views of most thinkers can be mapped along a continuum that stretches 
between these extremes.
As the eighteenth century wore on, the scales were tipping in favor of 
opening up the economy. F. H. Hinsley points out that, for the philosophes, 
genuine causes of war among humanity had all but disappeared. While there 
was a natural enmity between states, the relationship between human beings 
and societies was harmonious (Hinsley, 1963: 82). Wars, rivalry and decep-
tion, all part of the political landscape of Europe, could be abolished if free 
trade was allowed to flourish. Bellicosity was regarded as a sign of a bygone 
era, incongruous with the commercial spirit of the present. This convic-
tion animated Benjamin Constant’s The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation, 
a pamphlet published in 1814 in opposition to Napoleon’s military cam-
paigns. For Constant, “[w]e have finally reached the age of commerce, 
an age which must necessarily replace that of war” (Constant, 2010 [1814]: 
53). While fighting may have been warranted in the past, Constant vividly 
portrayed the drawbacks of the “spirit of conquest” for his age, where it 
survived as a pernicious anachronism. Only commerce, i.e., the “attempt to 
Perpetual Peace without Politics | 13
obtain by mutual agreement what one can no longer hope to obtain through 
violence”, is consistent with modern European civilization.
Hume concludes his essay on jealousy of trade by sketching his vision of 
international commerce:
Nature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates, and soils, to different nations, 
has secured their mutual intercourse and commerce, as long as they all remain 
industrious and civilized. […] I shall therefore venture to acknowledge, that, not 
only as a man, but as a BRITISH subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of 
GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, and even FRANCE itself. I am at least certain, that 
GREAT BRITAIN, and all those nations, would flourish more, did their sovereigns 
and ministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other. 
(Hume, 1987b [1758])
The characteristics of each country make it excel at producing different 
merchandizes that can subsequently be exchanged for what it lacks. Trade 
renders states mutually dependent since “the encrease [sic] of riches and 
commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the 
riches and commerce of all its neighbours” (Hume, 1987b [1758]). For 
Hume, the blindness of “sovereigns and ministers” is guilty of sowing discord 
and poisoning the otherwise peaceful relations between nations. But if com-
merce is advantageous for all and if politics is an impediment to fruitful and 
peaceful commercial exchanges, the very division of human beings into states 
becomes obsolete. Hume is already pointing towards a post-national trading 
community, when he writes not only as a British subject but also “as a man”. 
For Hume, as for Smith, a future of perpetual peace would entail recognizing 
that, beyond political divisions, human beings are, first and foremost, trading 
partners in the context of the ongoing economic progress of humankind. 
Homo Economicus
The understanding of commerce as a human right and the call of a variety 
of thinkers for a community of individuals freed from the fetters of narrow- 
-minded political allegiances and brought together by commercial exchanges 
presupposed that trade is a fundamental element of human nature. Whereas, 
in light of Aristotle’s famous definition, humans were regarded throughout 
most of the history of Western thought as “political animals”, the rise of 
international commerce gave birth to a conception of humankind as primar-
ily determined by trade.
Both Aristotle and later theorists of the economy agreed that humans were 
gregarious beings who came together out of necessity. They derived their 
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humanity from their union; in other words, before forming social bonds, 
humans were not really fully human. For Aristotle, society could not be 
conceived of outside the polis, “which is prior in nature to the household 
and to each of us individually” (Aristotle, trans. 1967: 1.1253a). Only within 
a political system can humanity reach its full potential. This was still, mutatis 
mutandis, Hobbes’s view of humankind: the social contract that protected 
individuals from the permanent war raging in the state of nature was what 
allowed human beings to thrive. In contrast, thinkers such as Adam Smith 
postulated the existence of a commercial sociability that preceded political 
relations and was independent from political institutions.
The commercial sociability envisioned by Smith followed in the wake of 
Christian notions of community. For Christian thinkers, individuals were 
naturally sociable and selfless, and while the Fall might have turned some 
away from this path, human predisposition toward cooperation could be 
restored through faith. Francis Hutcheson, a Christian philosopher and 
Smith’s professor at the University of Glasgow, was a well-known critic of 
Hobbes’s theory of the violent state of nature and a believer in an innate 
moral sense shared by all human beings that brought them together to create 
society. Smith agreed with Hutcheson’s claim that humans are sociable but 
refused the moralizing overtones of his thought. Moving beyond his earlier 
moral formulations as laid out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
portrayed human sociability in The Wealth of Nations as primarily the result 
of self-love that drove individuals to pursue their interests and, therefore, 
to join with others who could help them achieve their goals.1 Smith’s ideas 
echo the reflections on sociability by other Christian intellectuals, such as 
French theologian Pierre Nicole (1625-1695), who also defined civility as 
a product of self-love. For Nicole, it is natural to love oneself and to wish 
that what we love is, in turn, loved by others: we are civil, so that others 
love us. Human civility, then, “is only a sort of commerce of self-love, in which 
one endeavors to arouse the love of others by displaying some affection 
towards them” (Nicole, 2003: 59; emphasis added). Self-love comes naturally 
to humans and it is the engine that drives all other social relations.
Smith’s twist to Christian doctrines of natural sociability is to stress the 
commercial component of sociality. In his view, people came together from 
early on to exchange goods, as there is “a certain propensity in human 
nature to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another”. It is a matter 
1 For a detailed analysis of the influence on Smith of theories of sociability, especially of Pufendorf, 
see Hont (2010), “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the 
Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four Stages’ Theory”, Jealousy of Trade. International Competition 
and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective, 159-184.
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of indifference whether this propensity is innate or arose as a consequence of 
the development of human rationality and language. What matters is that it 
“is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals” (Smith, 
2012 [1776]: 18). As Smith makes clear in an oft-quoted passage, humans 
join in society with others out of self-interest, not out of moral imperatives 
or charitable impulses: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, 
but of their advantages. (ibidem: 19)
Smith’s concept of individuals as driven to sociality by self-interest and 
the need to exchange goods, impacts the very ontology of human beings. 
In modern nations “[e]very man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in 
some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly 
a commercial society” (ibidem: 27). All humans have become merchants, 
i.e., we are all, first and foremost, economic animals that depend on trade 
for survival. Politics turns into little more than an accessory to the sphere 
of commerce: 
A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any par-
ticular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries 
on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and together 
with it, all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. (ibidem: 413) 
A merchant – and we are all merchants – does not pledge allegiance to 
any specific state but follows her own interests and settles where conditions 
for trade are more advantageous. The growth of economic migration over 
the past few decades, often motivated by conditions of extreme poverty in 
the migrants’ home countries, is the darker side of Smith’s vision of humans 
as merchants. Nonetheless, for Smith, national politics will progressively 
recede into the background as the world commercial republic, predicated 
on free trade and populated by merchants, opens up limitless possibilities 
for economic improvement. 
In light of Smith’s vision of homo economicus, it is easy to understand how 
peace could be achieved through trade. According to this perspective, wars 
were motivated by the misguided assumption that humans require a well- 
-defined political framework and national allegiances to prosper. If pushed 
to its logical conclusion, Smith’s conception of individuals as merchants 
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would mean that politics would give way to a cosmopolitan republic of 
commerce. The engagement in trade would simply correspond to the 
unfolding of human ontology and to the fulfillment of humankind’s true 
nature. Perpetual peace would follow from unending economic progress 
achieved through the ceaseless exchange of goods in an apolitical society.
Commerce and Economic Equality
A powerful, pragmatic argument bolstering the understanding of free trade 
as the surest path towards peace was that commercial exchanges generated 
prosperity and economic equality. Already Crucé had noted that when mer-
chants are allowed to freely engage in commerce the general public stands 
to gain, as goods become cheaper (Crucé, 1909 [1623]: 60). More than a 
century and a half later, Smith would employ the same line of reasoning in 
his defense of free trade: when there are no impediments to free commercial 
exchanges, goods are made available at the cheapest possible price that still 
guarantees a reasonable profit to merchants. Monopolies and other interfer-
ences in the natural course of economic development might “promote the 
little interest of one little order of men in one country”, but they will “hurt 
the interests of all other orders of men in that country, and of all men in all 
other countries” (Smith, 2012 [1776]: 609).
Free commerce is a win-win activity, and therefore contrasts starkly with 
war, which brings chaos and destruction even to the victors. As Hume noted, 
jealousy of trade was based upon a misconception about economic opera-
tions, since those who espoused it did not realize that all parties involved 
in commercial exchanges stand to profit. Smith expanded on this insight in 
The Wealth of Nations: 
Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two 
distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land 
and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return 
for it something else for which there is a demand. (ibidem: 437)
Clearly, the profits of all of those involved in commerce are not the 
same, but Smith is adamant “that trade which, without force or constraint, 
is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places, is always 
advantageous, though not always equally so, to both” (ibidem: 479).
David Ricardo reiterated Smith’s assertions on the inherently advanta-
geous nature of trade in The Principles of Political Economy (1817). As he 
succinctly put it: “all trade, whether foreign or domestic, is beneficial” 
(Ricardo, 2004 [1817]: 214). For Ricardo, it is conceivable that one nation 
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might be able to produce all goods better and more efficiently and therefore 
have an absolute advantage over all others. Even so, trading in some goods 
would still be favorable to that country, since it will allow its capital to focus 
on the commodities it can produce more cheaply, i.e., with comparative 
advantage. Hence the conclusion that
[u]nder a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital 
and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of indi-
vidual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. […] 
it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie of interest and inter-
course, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized world. (ibidem: 81)
Underlying Hume, Smith and Ricardo’s belief in the beneficial outcome 
of free trade is the notion that commerce corrects potential imbalances. 
It allows individuals to direct their efforts towards the most profitable 
activities by freeing them from the production of goods that could be 
made cheaper in other countries or regions. Furthermore, it harmonizes 
the distribution of commodities throughout the world, eliminating both 
surpluses and scarcities. Trade not only binds together “the universal 
society of nations throughout the world”, as Ricardo eloquently wrote, but 
in point of fact it is the force that engenders this world society of buyers 
and sellers. It brings commodities to where they are needed, unceasingly 
working towards an imaginary point in the future when the entire human 
community will achieve a perfect equilibrium and everyone will possess 
exactly what they want and need.
Condillac had already elaborated on this optimistic view of the balanc-
ing ability of trade in his book Commerce and Government Considered in 
Their Mutual Relationship (1776). He envisioned a nation inhabited by a 
hard-working population divided into free cities that know “neither tolls, 
nor customs dues, nor arbitrary taxes, nor privileges, nor the police forces 
which hamper liberty” (Condillac, 2008 [1776]: 241). Commerce between 
the different areas of this nation played a key role in its economy: “it is 
essential that the surplus pours out without hindrance, reciprocally from 
the one [province] to the other, and that it supplies what is missing in the 
places where it spreads. It is a kind of ebb and flow where things balance” 
(ibidem: 241). For Condillac, commerce spreads goods more or less evenly 
between the various regions of his imaginary state and thus contributes to 
its social well-being. 
But trade has yet another even more significant function: it evens out 
differences in wealth. Condillac was not so naïve as to claim that everyone 
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would be equally well off in his fictional state. Some areas had a better loca-
tion for trade or were more fertile, and some individuals worked harder than 
others, all of which generated differences in wealth. But one province could 
only get richer than its neighboring regions up to a certain point. When 
an area had attracted too much wealth, labor and raw materials became 
too expensive and, in a situation of free trade, buyers would turn to other, 
cheaper suppliers: “manufactures will gradually decay in the provinces that 
they have enriched, and where the price of labour has risen; while they will 
recover in the other provinces which they must make wealthier, and where 
the price of labour is lower”. The poorer provinces will soon have reached 
a level of development similar to that of their neighbors and then the cycle 
will start anew: “This revolving motion will finish only to begin again […]. 
[It] will be without drawbacks, because it will happen naturally and without 
violence” (Condillac, 2008 [1776]: 254).
In the process described by Condillac, free trade distributes riches like 
“a river that divides itself in a host of channels, to water all the lands in 
succession” (ibidem). He considers that when commerce is unhindered 
“wealth spreads naturally everywhere” (Condillac, 2008 [1776]: 242) and 
that this fosters a “continuous balancing of wealth and population between 
all the provinces” (ibidem: 253). While an entire country can never reach a 
permanent equilibrium of affluence, economic growth always tends towards 
equalization. It produces a pendulum-like movement of riches that keeps 
the level of wealth more or less constant in all regions.
The economic forces identified by Condillac applied only within the bor-
ders of an imaginary, isolated nation, but others realized their consequences 
on a broader scale. In his essay “Of Money” (1742) David Hume pointed 
out that differences in prosperity separating nations tended to be erased by 
a natural distribution of wealth:
There seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human affairs, which checks the 
growth of trade and riches, and hinders them from being confined entirely to one people; 
as might naturally at first be dreaded from the advantages of an established commerce. 
[…] But these advantages are compensated, in some measure, by the low price of labour 
in every nation which has not an extensive commerce, and does not much abound in gold 
and silver. Manufactures, therefore gradually shift their places, leaving those countries 
and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are 
allured by the cheapness of provisions and labour. (Hume, 1987c [1742])
Hume’s explanation of the process through which economic disparities 
will progressively disappear prefigures some of the arguments of the debate 
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surrounding Scotland’s union with England in 1707. While some were 
skeptical about the economic advantages of this political move and believed 
that rich countries like England would always seek to exploit the resources 
of poorer ones and hamper rather than stimulate their development, the 
proponents of the union hoped that it would be economically advantageous 
for Scotland. For one, it would no longer have to compete with England for 
international markets. More importantly, however, were the relatively lower 
Scottish wages, which would prompt many English companies to move to 
the region, thus leading to rapid economic growth (Hont, 2010: 63ff).
Conclusion 
If free trade cancelled out disparities of wealth, it had the potential to 
free humanity from economic inequality. Through commercial exchange, 
wealth would progressively spread to all regions of the world, since the 
very economic underdevelopment of the poor placed them at an advantage 
vis-à-vis wealthier nations. The balancing function of commerce, another 
manifestation of the invisible hand that works through human interests 
towards the greater good, holds the promise of a prosperous future for 
all states, once differences in riches have been reduced to a minimum. 
All similarly affluent, nations would no longer have reasons to wage wars 
and an era of enduring peace would ensue. 
The current ideology of economic globalization rehashed this faith 
in the ability of the market to bring about universal well-being through 
unhampered free trade. Neoliberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman have 
restated classical arguments in favor of trade, highlighting the economic 
benefits of free trade identified by eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberal 
writers. In his bestseller, Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Friedman argues 
that the market is based upon the “voluntary co-operation of individuals”, 
which rests on the presupposition that “both parties to an economic trans-
action benefit from it, provided that the transaction is bilaterally voluntary 
and informed” (Friedman, 2002 [1962]: 13). Competitive capitalism is the 
model of society that results from the “free coordination without coercion” 
of all economic processes (ibidem). In spite of these lofty ideals, the early 
liberal aspiration to reduce differences of wealth both within the borders of 
a single country and between different states, together with the neoliberal 
dream of increasing the wealth of all countries through free trade, failed 
to materialize.
There is yet another hitch to the rosy picture of worldwide peace and 
prosperity achieved through the balance of affluence. If free trade leads to 
the equalization of wealth, raising prosperity in poor countries and reducing 
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it in already developed ones, why would rich nations wish to engage in it? 
Condillac’s answer would have been that this economic harmonization 
takes place “imperceptibly” and that the riches lost are clearly outweighed 
by the benefits of living in a society where there are no harmful imbalances. 
Other economists were more pragmatic and, realizing the potential back-
lash against the idea of a self-cancelling economic development, argued 
that affluent states could retain their competitive edge through continuous 
innovation. By creating ever-increasing labor-saving technologies and spe-
cializing in high-quality products, developed nations could remain at the 
forefront of economic development. This would mean that poorer states 
would be continuously catching up with their richer counterparts, forever 
behind in the technological rat race. Or, alternatively, that lower-income 
countries would succumb to the economic might of the richer, who would 
exploit differences of wealth without contributing to the overall growth of 
poorer nations. Be it as it may, the promise of increasing economic equality 
continues to underlie contemporary apologias of free trade as the fastest 
and surest route to world peace.
Even though the dream of a society of free trade is more of a reality in 
today’s “world mercantile republic” than early modern thinkers could 
ever have imagined, the aspirations of perpetual peace through commerce 
they espoused have failed to materialize. In our globalized societies, 
we are certainly living the dream of a world united by commerce but, like 
most dreams come true, it has not quite lived up to past expectations of 
perpetual peace.
Edited by João Paulo Moreira
References
Aristotle (1967), Politics. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press. Translation by 
H. Rackam.
Bellers, John (2008), “Some Reasons for an European State”, in E ref Aksu (ed.), Early 
Notions of Global Governance. Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals for ‘Perpetual 
Peace’. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 37-51 [orig. ed.: 1710].
Bentham, Jeremy (2008), “A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace”, in E ref Aksu 
(ed.), Early Notions of Global Governance. Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals 
for ‘Perpetual Peace’. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 138-172 [orig. ed.: 1789].
Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de (2008), Commerce and Government Considered in Their 
Mutual Relationship. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund [orig. ed.: 1776]. Translation by 
Shelagh Eltis.
Perpetual Peace without Politics | 21
Constant, Benjamin (2010), “The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and Their 
Relation to European Civilization”, in Biancamaria Fontana (ed.), Political Writings. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 43-167 [orig. ed.: 1814].
Crucé, Émeric (1909), The New Cyneas. Philadelphia: Allen, Lane and Scott [orig. ed.: 
1623]. Translation by Thomas Willing Balch.
Fénelon, François de (1994), Telemachus, Son of Ulysses. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press [orig. ed.: 1699]. Translation by Patrick Riley.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (2012), The Closed Commercial State. New York: SUNY Press 
[orig. ed.: 1800]. Translation by Anthony Curtis Addler.
Friedman, Milton (2002), Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago/London: The University of 
Chicago Press [orig. ed.: 1962].
Hinsley, Francis Harry (1963), Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and Practice in 
the History of Relations between States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hirschman, Albert (2013), The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before Its Triumph. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Hont, Istvan (2010), Jealousy of Trade. International Competition and the Nation-State 
in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, M.A./London: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press.
Hume, David (1987a), “Of Civil Liberty”, in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Essays, Moral, 
Political, Literary. Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty [orig. ed.: 1742]. 
Accessed on 09.04.2014, at http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/
hmMPL12.html.
Hume, David (1987b), “Of the Jealousy of Trade”, in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Essays, 
Moral, Political, Literary. Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty [orig. ed.: 
1758]. Accessed on 09.04.2014, at http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/
hmMPL29.html.
Hume, David (1987c), “Of Money”, in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Essays, Moral, Political, 
Literary. Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty [orig. ed.: 1742]. Accessed 
on 07.05.2014, at http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL26.html. 
Kant, Immanuel (2008a), “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in H. S. Reiss 
(ed.), Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 93-130 
[1st ed.: 1970].
Kant, Immanuel (2008b), “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in H. S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: 
Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131-175 [1st ed.: 1970].
Nicole, Pierre (2003), “Moral Essays”, in Henry C. Clark (ed.), Commerce, Culture and 
Liberty. Readings on Capitalism before Adam Smith. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 54-65.
Ricardo, David (2004), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Mineola, N.Y.: 
Dover Publications [orig. ed.: 1817].
Smith, Adam (2012), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Ware, England: Wordsworth Editions [orig. ed.: 1776].
22 | Patrícia Vieira 
Vitoria, Francisco de (2010), “On the American Indians”, in Anthony Pagden; Jeremy 
Lawrance (eds.), Vitoria: Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
231-292 [orig. ed.: 1538-1539].
Received on 21.10.2016
Accepted for publication on 07.05.2018
Patrícia Vieira
Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra
Colégio de S. Jerónimo, Largo D. Dinis, Apartado 3087, 3000-995 Coimbra, Portugal
Contact: pilmvieira@gmail.com 
Comércio em vez de guerra:  
paz perpétua sem política
Os defensores da ideia de paz perpétua 
veem frequentemente a política como um 
impedimento para estabelecer relações 
pacíficas entre todos os seres humanos. 
Para eles, a política exacerba as diferenças 
que separam as nações, enquanto que o 
comércio une os seres humanos. Neste 
artigo, examina-se o desenvolvimento de 
argumentos contra a política e a favor 
do comércio desde finais do século XV 
até ao início do século XIX. Demonstra-se 
como muitos pensadores adotaram uma 
visão idealizada do comércio enquanto 
atividade que leva à criação de uma comu-
nidade internacional pacífica, eliminando 
gradualmente desigualdades económicas. 
Salienta-se ainda como estas questões 
ecoam nos debates contemporâneos sobre 
globalização.
Palavras-chave: comércio livre; construção 
da paz; globalização; paz perpétua; relações 
económicas; relações políticas; resolução 
de conflitos.
Le commerce plutôt que la guerre:  
paix perpétuelle sans politique
Les défenseurs de l’idée de la paix per-
pétuelle voient fréquemment la politique 
comme un empêchement à ce que s’éta-
blissent des relations pacifiques entre tous 
les êtres humains. Pour eux, la politique 
exacerbe les différences qui séparent les 
nations, alors que le commerce établit 
des liens entre les êtres humains. Dans cet 
article, nous nous penchons sur le dévelop-
pement d’arguments contre la politique et 
favorables au commerce depuis la fin du 
XVe siècle jusqu’au début du XIXe siècle. 
Il y est démontré comment nombre de pen-
seurs adoptèrent une vision idéalisée du 
commerce en tant qu’activité menant à la 
création d’une communauté internationale 
pacifique et éliminant graduellement les 
inégalités économiques. Nous y soulignons 
aussi combien ces questions résonnent 
encore dans les débats contemporains sur 
la globalisation. 
Mots-clés: construction de la paix; globa-
lisation; libre-échange; paix perpétuelle; 
relations économiques; relations poli-
tiques; résolution de conflits.
